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Within James Joyce’s Ulysses, animal imagery and animal-human interaction
operate as encoded discussions of speech/speechlessness and language’s significance
to one’s existential status. Though there are myriad animal references throughout
Ulysses, dogs, cats, and the lamb figure of Rudy will be the primary focus, as these are
the interactions that most directly force Joyce’s characters to interpret the contents of
the inner non-human animal. From Stephen projecting his morbidity onto the dog in
Proteus to Bloom projecting his fears about Molly onto his cat in Calypso, understanding
the animal translates into an attempt to understand one’s own relationship to humanity.
In the most potent of these examples, Bloom’s infant son Rudy more closely resembles
an animal than a human in his complete speechlessness, problematizing the
subsequent response to his death. Bloom and Molly’s marriage suffers primarily over
their differing ways of mourning for, in the words of Molly, “what was neither one thing
nor the other” (Joyce 637). Rudy’s tragic, speechless ending necessitates exhaustive
interpretation for his parents, with the most biting question being, did he suffer? In the
wake of Rudy’s death, Bloom and Molly grow so alien to one another that they too
become, in the realm of their marital relationship, speechless. As critic David Rando
suggests, “in a book in which even a cap and a fan can speak and in which a dog can
write and recite poetry, Rudy Bloom is singularly speechless” (Rando 538). The
unintelligible “Mrkrgnao” of Bloom’s cat reflects the language of Ulysses, Bloom’s
ineffective attempts at communication, Molly’s inner-monologue, and most tragically, the
cries of Rudy.
In his essay “Hume on the Moral Difference between Humans and Other
Animals,” Denis Arnold attempts to synthesize the work done by Hume on differentiating
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human and animal. The 18th century philosopher’s ruminations on animals were
motivated in large part by his desire to analyze and define human nature. Beginning his
essay, Arnold writes, “In the Treatise and both of the Enquiries, as well as in various
essays, Hume appeals to comparisons between humans and other animals to support
his analyses of human reason, human sympathy, the human passions, and human
morality” (Arnold 303). He goes on to suggest that Hume uses animals as a model to
demonstrate what animals lack, and subsequently what humans have. Hume departed
from the ideas of Descartes and acknowledged that animals do hold a certain degree of
reason, albeit quite different from human reason (Arnold 307). Despite the difference,
Hume believed that reason alone failed to satisfy the overarching distinction between
man and animal. Instead, he suggested that the core difference existed in something he
referred to as “the sentiment of humanity.” In Hume’s second Enquiry, he describes this
sentiment:
[It] cannot be disputed, that there is some benevolence,
however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of
friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove
kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf
and serpent. Let these generous sentiments be supposed
ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand
or finger of our body, they must still direct the determinations
of our mind, and where everything else is equal, produce a
cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to
mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. (Arnold
309)
While Hume resists defining the human-animal distinction as the ability to sympathize, it
is a sort of global empathy that exists at the heart of Hume’s “sentiment of humanity.”
Moreover, human perception of other humans as possessing the same agreeable
qualities causes a kinship and subsequently an emotional attachment.
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In more recent scholarship, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s “The Open:
Man and Animal” explores the relationship between, and distinction within, man and
animal. In the first of two epigraphs that begin the book, Agamben quotes GeorgesLouis Buffon: “If animals did not exist, the nature of man would be even more
incomprehensible” (Agamben). In this epigraph, it is implicit that animal’s
meaningfulness resides at least somewhat in their utility as human foils—a way to think
about human nature as special in comparison to the animal. Hume goes on to discuss
the differences in regards to animal and human experience of their respective
perceptions. Borrowing from Heidegger, Agamben suggests that the animal
experiences a “poverty in world,” which prevents it from having access to the human
world of concealment and revelation. In the book’s fifteenth chapter, “World and Earth,”
Agamben uses Heidegger’s ideas to formulate a distinction between man and animal
based on the idea of disclosure—the ability to disclose an absolute truth about one’s
being. The world, as a human realm open in the sense of its community and culture, is
accessible only by human sensibility. On the other hand, the earth, roughly defined as
the natural, is essentially closed in terms of its inability to unveil any truth about itself.
Quoting Heidegger, Agamben writes:
The stone is worldless. Plant and animal likewise have no
world; but they belong to the veiled throng of an environment
in which they hang suspended. The peasant woman, on the
other hand, has a world because she dwells in the open of
beings…’ World and earth, openness and closedness—
though opposed in an essential conflict—are, however,
never separable: ‘The Earth is the spontaneous emerging
toward nothing of that which constantly closes itself and thus
saves itself. World and earth are essentially different from
one another and yet are never separated. The world grounds
itself on the earth, and the earth juts through world.
(Agamben 51)
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Agamben suggests that the “earth” is comprised of those who are “closed” in
themselves. Animals, in the idea that humans cannot penetrate their experience of the
world, are necessarily “closed” from outside understanding and unable to disclose any
absolute truth in regards to their nature. However, Heidegger also suggests, as does
Agamben, that the “truth” at the center of humanity, starts first in the non-truth of the
closed animal—a sort of potentiality traversed only by the evolution of non-human
animal to humanity. Attempting to understand this non-truth, or closedness, at the
center of the non-human animal is what drives both interpretation of the animal and
introspection of oneself among Joyce’s characters.
During Proteus, while walking on Sandymount Strand, Stephen has the first
meaningful animal encounter of the novel. Shortly after seeing a dead dog carcass in
the sand, Stephen sees another dog, this time alive, running toward him. Though
Stephen addresses the canine from a distance, he nonetheless attempts to understand
the dog’s motives. Considering this, he thinks, “Lord, is he going to attack me” (Joyce
37). As soon as the dog is in sight, Stephen begins attributing to the dog his own fears
about them, assuming the dog will attack him. Part of this response may stem from
Joyce’s own commonly known fear of dogs, but also from the general social stigma of
canine aggression. Stephen takes these interpretations a step further than Bloom does
later with his cat, as the dog gives no interpretable signs to suggest he will attack.
Stephen’s thoughts about the dog are generated purely from his own consciousness
and his own fears. In Ulysses: A Casebook, Derek Attridge suggests, “In portraying the
unreflective and animal, the text undoes our belief in the natural by circling us back to
the social and to a language that purposefully confuses nature and culture” (Attridge
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67). This confusion of nature and culture, a result of the need for animal interpretation
and interpretation’s inevitable bias, continues in the scene as Stephen watches the
dog’s movements on the beach. Standing still in observation, Stephen thinks, “Their dog
ambled about a bank of dwindling sand, trotting, sniffing on all sides. Looking for
something lost in a past life. Suddenly he made off like a bounding hare, ears flung
back, chasing the shadow of a lowskimming gull” (Joyce 38). While the first and last
descriptions of the dog’s behavior seem consistent, Stephen also includes an idea
clearly in line with his stream-of-conscious narration—the looking for something in a
past life. Having recently lost his mother, he appears to be grasping for a lost stability he
had before his mother’s death. Seeing the dog “sniffing on all sides” reminds him of his
own search for stability, which he then applies to the dog. The unreflective, speechless
dog forces Stephen to forego the natural for the social, which in this case manifests as
Stephen’s attempt to process his grief. Granted, there is something sad about nature
itself, as Rando writes quoting Walter Benjamin, “Because she is mute, nature mourns”
(Rando 536).
As the dog comes upon the dead dog carcass, a scene clearly meant to mirror
Stephen’s own experience with his mother’s corpse, the dog sniffs, stalks, and noses
the corpse to understand what he sees. Stephen, imagining what the dog must be
thinking, says to himself, “Ah, poor dogsbody! Here lies poor dogsbody’s body” (Joyce
39). The assumption that Stephen makes here, in imagining how the canine might react
to death, suggests that the dog has some fundamental understanding of death. It is
possible that Stephen assumes this because the dog is symbolically closer to death, in
its lack of speech and lack of self-awareness, than any human could be. Interestingly,
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while Stephen at least analyzes the scene and considers what the dog might be
thinking, the dog’s owners, impatient with animal speechlessness, chide him for his
curiosity. When they see the dog sniffing around the carcass, they yell out, “Tatters!
Outofthat, you mongrel!” (Joyce 39). Differing from Stephen’s analysis of the scene, the
owners just want the dog to stay away from the rotten, likely diseased body. Thoughts
about whether Tatters can understand death, or if he recognized the carcass as the
dead of his kind, do not cross the minds of the two owners. The dog reacts to the
chiding by “skulking back to his master,” where a “blunt bootless kick sent him
unscathed across a spit of sand, crouched in flight” (Joyce 39). Confident in their
superiority, the owners essentially punish the dog for his inability to respond with
reason. Either unaware of his state of servitude, or aware of his inability to explain
himself, Tatters resorts to urinating and digging a hole. Seeing the urination and digging
as coping and calming devices used by Tatters after being scolded, Stephen remarks to
himself, “The simple pleasures of the poor” (Joyce 39).
Stephen continues to look on as the dog “dabbles and delves” in the sand, and
again, Stephen places himself in the “dogsbody,” thinking, “Something he buried there,
his grandmother” (Joyce 39). Remembering the answer to the riddle he spoke of in
Nestor, “The fox burying its grandmother under a hollybush,” Stephen reverts once
more to his own dead mother. In fact, the entire scene in which Stephen attempts to
analyze Tatter’s actions on the beach, he is inadvertently attributing his own tendencies
and anxieties to the dog. Unable to express anything true about his reactions to the
carcass on the beach, the dog’s intended purpose is limited to the perspectives of
Stephen and its owners, both of whom fail to recognize the dog’s unreachable interior.
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In the Homeric parallel, Proteus is a god of the sea, who is at once both a holder of true
knowledge and a shapeshifting deceiver (Burns 970, 971). While Stephen ponders the
truths and untruths of the world in Proteus, he agonizes over the unattainability of
absolute truth. The dog, who may be the shapeshifting Proteus himself, symbolizes this
vain attempt at finding truth, deceiving Stephen by appearing in a speechless,
impenetrable form. If Stephen connects with the dog in any meaningful way in his
mission for truth, it is when he also urinates on the beach, momentarily foregoing the
dark, grandiose thoughts of the chapter and engaging in a simple, animal pleasure.
In a passage of lighter tone, Bloom shares the company of several men in a pub,
one of whom, referred to as ‘the Citizen,” is accompanied by a “bloody mangy mongrel,
Garryowen” (Joyce 242). The unknown narrator of this chapter holds the power to
portray and describe Garryowen, and does so via cultural interpretations. He begins by
remarking, “Be a corporal work of mercy if someone would take the life of that bloody
dog. I’m told for a fact he ate a good part of the breeches off a constabulary man…that
came round one time with a blue paper about a license” (Joyce 243). In the phrase “I’m
told for a fact,” mythmaking is inherently present. The man was presumably told a story,
taken for fact, that he now uses to define the dog’s nature. This characterization of
Garryowen continues in a section of hyperbolic parody that reads:
while at his feet reposed a savage animal of the canine tribe
whose stertorous gasps announced that he was sunk in
uneasy slumber, a supposition confirmed by hoarse growls
and spasmodic movements which his master repressed from
time to time by tranquilizing blows of a mighty cudgel rudely
fashioned out of Paleolithic stone. (Joyce 244)
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Humorously, Garryowen is described as “savage” and deserving of murder, despite him
simply sleeping by his master. Though his slumber is “uneasy” and he lets out “hoarse
growls,” this seems inefficient to suggest savagery. Granted, next to the chapter’s
tongue-in-cheek Irish hero, the Citizen, the situation necessitates a description of
Garryowen as tribal, spasmodic, and dangerous. This attribution of savagery continues
throughout the chapter, with the narrator referring to training dogs by kindness as
“drivel,” and describing Garryowen’s tongue as “hanging out of him a yard long or more”
(Joyce 251). The narrator consistently uses his own cultural knowledge to describe the
dog as savage, despite no grounded basis for the interpretations.
Nonetheless, Garryowen’s status as a “mongrel,” in a chapter that concerns
“nationalism and history,” surpasses simple explanations of the narrator’s observations
as misunderstanding the dog’s nature. In his essay “Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy
Mongrel of Irish Modernity,” Sam Slote argues that Garryowen is a representation of
Irish national identity, albeit a stereotypical representation. Of Garryowen’s name, Slote
writes:
…the name Garryowen is fitting because it combines the title
of a popular Irish roistering song—to go with the national
context—and the filthy associations of Garryowen, the
suburb of Limerick which the song celebrates. Garryowen is
thus the perfect figure for raucous, thuggish Irish
nationalism, his mongrel status no accidental attribute (Slote
548).
Thus, the reader begins to understand Garryowen both as a dog and as a symbol for
the savage nationalism espoused in the chapter. Because the Citizen himself
symbolizes this, Garryowen is easily utilized as a mirror of the Citizen due to his
speechlessness and inability to object. The climactic moment of this characterization
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comes when Garryowen transforms into Owen Garry, “the famous old Irish red setter
wolfdog formerly known by the sobriquet Garryowen,” who proceeds to recite a Celtic
Irish poem. One of the jokes here, buried under a hyperbolic newspaper story
describing Owen Garry’s poetic career, is that Owen Garry has not penned a poem in
human language, but rather in the “metrical system of the canine” (Joyce 256). The
narrator of the section suggests just before the poem, “Perhaps it should be added that
the effect is greatly increased if Owen’s verse be spoken somewhat slowly and
indistinctly in a tone suggestive of suppressed rancor” (Joyce 256). Suppressed rancor
seems to be alluding to a growl, making the entire poem an interpretation of his growling
in response to the Citizen. Of this scene, Slote comments, “Garryowen, or rather Owen
Garry, here becomes representative of the Irishman: a dog waxing eloquent in Irish.
Owen Garry's verse, we are told, ‘bears a striking resemblance (the italics are ours) to
the ranns of ancient Celtic bards’” (Slote 551). Even as an Irishman with the gift of
poetic recitation, the dog is nonetheless still just a dog asking for water. The
interpretation of his growls as Celtic poetry is not the “spread of human culture among
the lower animals,” but rather the attribution of human culture to animals. This attribution
continues throughout the chapter, as the unnamed narrator continually applies features
to the dog that he does not quite deserve.
At a later point in the chapter, the narrator reports, “and the Citizen scowling after
him and the dog at his feet looking up to know who to bite and when” (Joyce 266).
Though it seems the narrator is applying this type of characterization unfairly from his
own biases, one must consider, maybe Garryowen is a dangerous, scary, mangy
mongrel. However, during Gerty McDowell’s narration, this possibility is problematized.
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Being the Citizen’s niece, Gerty knows Garryowen and presumably would have spent
some time with him. In both an attempt to complicate the interpretations of Garryowen’s
nature and reference his poetic gift, Gerty remarks, “and the photograph of grandpa
Giltrap’s lovely dog Garryowen that almost talked it was so human” (Joyce 289). To this
point of different perspectives, or of parallax, Slote describes several animals in the
book as “plural,” meaning they are described in different ways throughout the novel
depending on who is doing the describing. Given that these animals are, for the most
part, speechless, this plurality must be a direct result of interpretations coming from
different perspectives. Commenting on this plurality, Slote writes:
Like the Citizen and the metamorphosing dogs in ‘Proteus,’
and ‘Circe,’ Garryowen is himself plural. When first espied,
the narrator describes him as a ‘bloody mangy mongrel.’ On
the other hand…Garryowen is ‘a savage animal of the
canine tribe whose stertorous gasps announced that he was
sunk in uneasy slumber…In the following episode,
‘Nausicaa,’ another variant perspective is proferred: Gerty
McDowell, in the festering mawkishness of the episode’s
style, describes him as ‘grandpa Giltrap’s lovely dog
Garryowen that almost talked it was so human.’ The dog is
then mongrelized through the multiplicity of perspectives
brought to bear upon him (Slote 550).
As one of the more complicated animal interactions in the novel, Garryowen remains a
dog that cannot talk and cannot insist on his own characterization. His reputation relies
on interpretation and mythmaking, the consequences of existing without language.
By the dreamlike Circe episode, both Stephen and Bloom have encountered
dogs over the course of the day. Being both a synthesis and perversion of the day’s
events, as dreams are, Circe’s dog figures are a reflection of previous intersections of
humanity and animality, as well as of literal dogs from earlier in the novel. The first dog
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encounter occurs as Stephen and Lynch wander on Mecklenburgh Street. The scene,
written in the form of stage directions, reads, “(He flourishes his ashplant, shivering the
lamp image, shattering light over the world. A liver and white spaniel on the prowl slinks
after him, growling. Lynch scares it with a kick)” (Joyce 353). The scene here mirrors
Stephen’s previous encounter with the dog in Proteus, who appears to him as similarly
menacing. As is the case before, Stephen’s fear of dogs defines and influences his
experience of them, both in his mode of thinking and in the dog’s behavior. In what
seems like free indirect discourse, the stage directions appear to be describing the dog
as Stephen sees it—“on the prowl,” “slinking,” and “growling” (Joyce 353). Immediately
following this interaction is Stephen musing over the nature of language, as he looks
back at the defeated canine just kicked by Lynch. To Lynch, Stephen proposes, “So that
gesture, not music not odour, would be a universal language, the gift of tongues
rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm” (Joyce
353). He ponders the possibility of gesture, rather than speech, serving as the
communicative tool of all beings. By replacing speech with gesture, Stephen imagines a
world in which animals and humans could speak to one another. In this scenario, the
dog Lynch so promptly kicked may have been able to explain why he was approaching,
rather than having his intentions made opaque by speechlessness.
Equally important, though, is the second half of Stephen’s statement, in which he
elevates speech to a divine level. With gesture covering the “lay sense,” speech
becomes a surrogate for the soul, the “first entelechy” (Joyce 353). In this formulation,
humans would be freed from the burden of interpretation, enabling them to converse
with species of all natures, while simultaneously affirming human dominion over all
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others as the ones bearing a soul. Earlier in the novel, the reader learns of Stephen’s
refusal to pray over his dying mother. Driven by his struggle with religious belief,
Stephen simply cannot bring himself to pray, despite the insurmountable guilt this
causes him. By imagining a world in which the soul is made visible by one’s words,
Stephen imagines a world in which he is free to pray over his mother. It would no longer
be necessary to mock the Catholic Church, since he would be inherently sure of his soul
and of God. Although this section appears before the episode turns truly dreamlike,
Stephen’s discussion of language is a sort of daydream, in which animal interpretation
is unnecessary and the human soul is a given.
The next Circe canine encounter, this time with Bloom, features a dog from
earlier in the novel—Garryowen. Differing greatly from Stephen’s experience with the
spaniel, Garryowen approaches Bloom with “his tongue outlolling, panting” (Joyce 369).
The difference between the two descriptions lies more in the disparity between Bloom
and Stephen’s animal interpretations than it does in the difference between the dog’s
personalities. When juxtaposed with the earlier rendering of Garryowen’s personality as
a “savage animal,” the dog’s actions here display that Joyce’s animals take on the
personality attributed to them. Bloom might wonder whether Garryowen is “mad,” but he
nonetheless speaks to him in a friendly tone, coaxing the dog with “Good fellow! Fido!
Good fellow! Garryowen!” (Joyce 370). Regretting his earlier decision to buy the meat,
Bloom wonders what to do with it. In a performative gesture, the dog “drives a cold
snivelling muzzle against his hand, wagging his tail” (Joyce 369). The dog’s nuzzling
presents Bloom with the task of interpretation—is the dog being affectionate, hungry, or
some combination of the two? Comparing canine tendencies to female tendencies,
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Bloom uses his interpretive power to assume that dogs like “rencontres,” or chance
meetings (Joyce 370, Gifford 461). In making this assumption, Bloom inadvertently
suggests that he understands as much about dogs as he does about women, which is
tragically little. It becomes clear that speechlessness and its consequences extend to
women as well, in that Bloom struggles to understand what it means to be a woman,
and by extension, what women enjoy. Both women and animals fit into a category that
interest Bloom, but also puzzle him, and therefore require interpretive power to guess at
their natures. Nonetheless, while Stephen fears the dog in part because he does not
understand it, Bloom holds no such grudge for those he does not understand. Curiosity,
rather than fear, characterize Bloom’s approach to these problems, while Stephen
regularly faces the latter. Bloom feeds Garryowen the meat and when accosted by the
Watchmen, defends his actions by proclaiming, “I am doing good to others” (Joyce 370).
The last notable instance of the canine in Circe comes as Paddy Dignam
appears, transformed into a human-sized, corpse-like beagle. Dignam, who died a few
days before the events of Ulysses, defends Bloom during his ridiculous mock trial,
testifying that he saw Bloom at his funeral. However, rather than his words, Dignam’s
appearance is of most importance in this scene. The stage directions describing him as
he appears reads:
The beagle lifts his snout, showing the grey scorbutic face of
Paddy Dignam. He has gnawed all. He exhales a putrid
carcasefed breath. He grows to human size and shape. His
dachshund coat becomes a brown mortuary habit. His green
eye flashes bloodshot. Half of one ear, all the nose and both
thumbs are ghouleaten. (Joyce 385)
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In his essay “Syphilisation and Its Discontents,” Martin Bock suggests that Dignam’s
appearance relates to Stephen’s fear of “beastly death,” a reference to the earlier scene
with the dead dog in Proteus (Bock 138). Assuming there is no God, something
Stephen grapples with incessantly, the consequences of death are unknown. As death
removes the mind and leaves just the physical body, the human is made equal with all
other animals, or beasts. Describing Stephen’s fear, Bock writes, “Joyce’s soul-corpses
are metonymically transmigrated: death’s disfigurement transforms the human to
animal, to anthropomorph, and finally to ghoul. The ‘carcasefed breath’ of the beagle
recalls the breath of ‘wetted ashes’ that characterizes the ghost of Stephen’s mother”
(Bock 138). Struggling to accept the notion of a soul, Stephen interprets death as the
putrid transformation into something rotten and mindless. Living primarily in his own
mind, the thought of living without his thoughts forces him to imagine living only with
one’s physical body, which will inevitably rot. Death, then, becomes another animal
requiring interpretation, just as the dogs met previously in the novel had required.
Similar to the dogs encountered throughout Ulysses, Bloom’s cat forces him to
explicate her feline behaviors, in turn forcing Bloom to explore his own psyche. In his
essay “The Cat’s Meow: Ulysses, Animals, and the Veterinary Gaze,” David Rando
writes, “[Animals] were exposed to the language of rationality and were apprehended
through a new lens that, borrowing from Foucault, I call the ‘veterinary gaze’” (Rando
529). In Bloom’s introductory scene, he interacts with his black cat while making
breakfast, pondering her vocalizations, her movements, her health, and her behaviors,
effectively applying the “veterinary gaze” that Rando refers to. As is also noted by
Rando, Bloom pays particular attention to the cat’s vocalizations, which are
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differentiated through three different spellings: “Mkgnao,” “Mrkgnao,” and “Mrkrgnao”
(Joyce 45, Rando 535). Bloom understands the first vocalization as a greeting, returning
his cat’s meow with “O, there you are…” (Joyce 45). Mimicking what he believes she’s
thinking, he thinks, “Prr. Scratch my head. Prr.” The cat’s second vocalization comes
after Bloom says, “Milk for the pussens,” and Bloom appears to recognize the meow as
the cat’s excitement and desire for the milk. Following the second vocalization is a
series of thoughts about human’s underestimation of the cat’s ability to process human
communication. The last vocalization, which is noted to be the loudest, is uttered after
Bloom says to the cat, “Afraid of the chickens she is. Afraid of the chookchooks. I never
saw such a stupid pussens as the pussens” (Joyce 45). Presumably, Bloom is joking
around with the cat, and her loud response is an acknowledgement of his jesting insult.
Nonetheless, all of Bloom’s assumptions about the cat stem from his effort to
understand her perspective, despite this being unattainable knowledge. At one point he
thinks to himself, “Wonder what I look like to her” (Joyce 45). To understand her
perspective, he must examine his own, applying human logic where he sees fit. This
scene introduces the problem of parallax, in which an object might appear differently
depending on the position one sees it from. When Bloom wonders what he looks like to
the cat, he’s truly wondering how others see him, especially his wife, Molly. In the
subsequent episode Lotus Eaters, Bloom has a similar encounter with a horse, in which
he thinks, “Damn all they know or care about anything with their long noses stuck in
nosebags. Too full for words. Still they get their feed all right and their doss. Gelded too:
a stump of black gutta-percha wagging limp between their haunches. Might be happy all
the same that way. Good poor brutes they look” (Joyce 63). Observing the horse, Bloom
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considers the reasoning for its speechlessness, wonders about its state of nakedness,
and pities its ignorance. But, rather than being purely observational, Bloom also
appears to be relating how others see him throughout the day, knowing that many of the
people he encounters around Dublin are aware of his wife’s affair with Blazes Boylan.
Frequently thinking of food to distract himself from the coming events, Bloom resembles
the horse who finds solace in its food. Bloom goes on to imagine others gazing at him,
who are mindful of Molly and Blazes, thinking of him as simple and aloof. In the minds
of passers-by, Bloom hears the echo of, “Might be happy all the same that way. Good
poor [brute he looks]” (Joyce 63). He is attempting to measure and calculate, in social
terms, the level of distortion that parallax introduces in attempting to analyze another’s
character. In reflecting on his cat and on the horse, Bloom unveils parts of his
personality that Joyce surely wanted readers to decode in an introduction to Bloom,
including his complicated relationship with his wife, Molly, and the role parallax plays in
their misunderstandings.
In the middle of his interaction with the pussens, Bloom remarks to himself, “They
understand what we say better than we understand them. She understand all she wants
to. Vindictive too. Cruel. Her nature. Curious mice never squeal. Seem to like it” (Joyce
45). The cat’s gender is key, as Bloom is thinking about Molly and uses the female cat
as a proxy in his thoughts about her. To this point Rando writes, “Critics have noted how
his thoughts about the cat shift subtly into thoughts about Molly, facilitated by the
attribution of feline qualities to human females but also by his masochistic fantasy of
being punished” (Rando 535-536). From his analysis of his cat pours an analysis of his
marriage and a connection to his wife’s upcoming infidelities. It becomes clear that
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Bloom fears the power of women and their capability for vengeance, but it is also clear
that he enjoys this to some degree. Having committed his own infidelities, albeit less
serious, Bloom knows Molly will respond to his extramarital activities with her own.
Nonetheless, beneath his sadness and anxiety, there is taboo excitement. This
masochism becomes an integral part of Bloom’s complex characterization, complicating
one of the novel’s central problems—Molly’s affair with Blazes Boylan. Bloom projects
all of these sharply human feelings onto his cat, who seems only to be performing for
her milk and her food, unaware of the traits being assigned her.
In her essay “Art and Life, Nature and Culture,” Cheryl Herr suggests that
Bloom’s interactions with the cat parallel his early morning interactions with Molly (Herr
66). Of this parallel, Herr aptly explains, “Molly’s twice repeated ‘Poldy’ and insistence
that he hurry with the tea are forms of mild anxious, aggressive purring. Bloom ‘calmly’
gazes at Molly’s ‘large, soft bubs, sloping within her nightdress like a shegoats udder,’
much as he observes the cats whiskers and sheen…Molly drinks her tea with a degree
of self-absorption also found in the milk lapping ‘pussens’ (Herr 66). In fact, Molly’s first
sound of the novel, “Mn,” is a seemingly shortened but undifferentiated form of
“Mkgnao” (Joyce 46). From the similarities between Molly and the cat, one might
consider the way in which Molly’s inner nature is just as inaccessible to Bloom as the
cat’s is. From her monologue in “Penelope,” Molly shows the reader the multitudes of
thoughts being kept from Bloom, making their relationship one in which each partner
has to interpret the other’s inner nature. Hauntingly, this is the same dilemma causing
the rift in their opinions about Rudy and his inaccessibility. Bloom’s interactions with
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Molly and with the cat foreground the rest of the novel in terms of what is and what is
not accessible.
An equally important aspect of Joyce’s choosing to introduce Bloom through an
interaction with a cat is expressed by Rando, as he writes, “Joyce's decision to
introduce Bloom and the cat together is also a stroke of thematic economy because the
interspecies encounter foregrounds language and speechlessness” (Rando 536). This
speechlessness highlighted by Rando is a theme that haunts Bloom throughout
Ulysses. The constant need to analyze, often resulting in over-analysis, frames Bloom’s
encounters with countless characters in the novel. His ride to Paddy Dignam’s funeral,
his attempts at conversation with Stephen, his inability to contribute at Barney Kiernan’s
pub, his failure to properly communicate with Molly, and most importantly his dead
infant son all represent the problem of speechlessness, whether literal or just his failure
to communicate. At one point during the “Nausicaa” episode, Bloom thinks to himself,
“Metempsychosis. They believed you could be changed into a tree from grief” (Joyce
309). Considering that a tree is an object of nature belonging to what Agamben says
Heidegger would label “earth,” a speechless entity closed in itself, it is possible that
Ulysses aims to document Bloom’s struggle against becoming speechless in the face of
grief.
In his essay, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” philosopher Jacques Derrida
provides his own commentary on the relationship between man and non-human
animal—specifically between man and cat. In the first pages of the essay, Derrida
considers the effect of the animal stare: “Since time, therefore. Since so long ago, can
we say that the animal has been looking at us? What animal? The other. I often ask
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myself, just to see, who I am—and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught
naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for example the eyes of a cat, I have
trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming my embarrassment” (Derrida 372). Speaking of
both literal and figurative nudity, Derrida wonders how the animal gaze manages to strip
the human down, crossing the existential lines that divide human and non-human
animal. He aptly describes how the speechless animal gaze is at the root of humanity’s
interpretative failure, writing, “We could nickname this denuded passivity with a term
that will come back more than once…seeing oneself seen naked under a gaze that is
vacant to the extent of being bottomless, at the same time innocent and cruel, perhaps
sensitive and impassive, good and bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable,
abyssal and secret” (Derrida 381). The “secret” that Derrida refers to forces humans to
imagine its contents, to interpret and decide, to assign a personality and nature to the
animal other, but also to assign a nature to oneself. Toward the end of the essay,
Derrida asks his readers, “But cannot this cat also be, deep within her eyes, my primary
mirror?” (Derrida 418). Analyzing the animal becomes not only an exploration in the
delineations of human and nonhuman, but also an exploration into one’s own place in
those delineations—one’s place among humankind. Still, there are consequences for
the animal in its passive engagement with this analysis. Both Garryowen, Bloom’s cat,
and the dog on the beach are victims of this unfair human judgment, which strips them
of their own expression in exchange for understanding the self. However, human
interpretation stripping animals of their expression becomes problematized when one
considers the opposite situation, in which humans do no interpreting whatsoever.
Addressing this issue of human disconnection from animal, Derrida writes:
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But in forbidding myself thus to assign, interpret or project,
must I conversely give in to the other violence or stupidity,
that which would consist in suspending one's compassion
and in depriving the animal of every power of manifestation,
of the desire to manifest to me anything at all, and even to
manifest to me in some way its experience of my language, of
my words and of my nudity? (Derrida 387)
In other words, if animal silence inherently effaces any true human understanding of
their intentions and experience, then that would seem to strip animals of their ability to
express experience even more. Expression, then, becomes a paradox in which animal
speechlessness both prevents the non-human animal from expressing oneself and the
human from interpreting any attempt at non-human animal expression. Further, it blurs
the lines between human and non-human animal existence, essentially muddying the
definitions of humanity derived from juxtaposition with perceived animal expression.
Derrida goes on to question the idea of “animal” as an all-encompassing term, “as if all
nonhuman living things could be grouped without the common sense of this
‘commonplace,’ the Animal” (Derrida 402). Given the failure of non-human animal as a
general term, animal expression becomes a singularity, no longer able to be used as
the tool by which humans note our different, higher natures. Language as a dividing
concept between human and animal is also challenged by the potential individuality of
the animal, and the potential for thought beyond language. Derrida’s question of, “What
this animal is, what it will have been, what it would, would like to, or could be,” is made
inaccessible to humans through lack of common language, but hints at an existence
beyond language.
In considering the consequences of speechlessness and lack-of-language, it
seems prudent to determine what language encompasses. In his essay “On Language
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as Such and on the Language of Man,” Walter Benjamin broadly defines language as,
“the tendency inherent in the subjects concerned—technology, art, justice, or religion—
toward the communication of the contents of the mind” (Benjamin 62). For Benjamin,
language is not limited to words, but is rather comprised of anything that communicates
the so-called “contents of the mind.” He suggests that the mental entity of a being, for
which the word “consciousness” disappointingly fails to capture, must not be conflated
with language. To this point, Benjamin posits, “The view that the mental essence of a
thing consists precisely in its language—this view, taken as a hypothesis, is the great
abyss into which all linguistic theory threatens to fall” (Benjamin 63). Benjamin’s
argument complicates the idea that lacking complex language, or the ability to
communicate the contents of one’s mind, rules out the possibility of any complex
consciousness. Language, therefore, emerges from this mental entity rather than being
the mental entity itself. The ideas and thoughts that are communicable become
language, while other parts of the mental entity are essentially incommunicable and
unknowable to others (Benjamin 63). Because of humanity’s inability to comprehend
any part of the non-human mental entity, human language has imposed a selfreferential system of language with naming at the core. Based on the biblical precedent
of Adam having named the world’s animals, Benjamin suggests that it is the linguistic
being of man to name things, and in naming things, like the “fox” or “lamp,” those things
communicate themselves to humans. Because of humanity’s domination over the
language of naming, humans distance themselves from the non-human animal as
separate, as that which humans have given linguistic and existential meaning. It is also
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an act of elevation, in which the human elevates itself and establishes political dominion
over the non-human animal, and even over the earth.
Considering Rudy, the human infant communicates itself to its parents solely
through the parent’s own naming, and fails to communicate anything of itself. The
entirety of the infant’s mental entity is incommunicable in the same way that a cat’s
mental entity is incommunicable. This appears to be the perspective of Molly in defining
Rudy as “what was neither one thing nor the other” (Joyce 637). Nonetheless, Benjamin
offers up a different perspective on the importance of naming in human language, one
that fits more closely with Bloom’s understanding of Rudy’s existential status. He
describes naming as the point where human and God meet, and in a sense,
collaborate:
The theory of proper names is the theory of the frontier
between finite and infinite language. Of all beings, man is the
only one who names his own kind, as he is the only one
whom God did not name. By giving names, parents dedicate
their children to God; the names they give do not
correspond—in a metaphysical rather than etymological
sense—to any knowledge, for they name newborn children.
In a strict sense, no name ought (in its etymological meaning)
to correspond to any person, for the proper name is the word
of God in human sounds. By it each man is guaranteed his
creation by God, and in this sense he is himself creative, as is
expressed by mythological wisdom in the idea (which
doubtless not infrequently comes true) that a man's name is
his fate. The proper name is the communion of man with the
creative word of God. (Benjamin 69).
In this sense, the self-referential naming practiced on animals differs from the divine
practice of naming humans—no name given to an infant is etymologically theirs.
Instead, the name humans give their offspring reflect the creative powers of God, and
instill a small part of God in the child. Being alive long enough for Bloom and Molly to
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name, Rudy is elevated above the non-human animal by means of his name. Here, one
sees the justification in elevating the human over the rest of the earth, in establishing
the “communion of man with the creative word of God” (Benjamin 69). Commenting on
Benjamin’s discussion of naming, Derrida refers to the practice as “a foreshadowing of
mourning” in that “every case of naming involves announcing a death to come in the
surviving of a ghost” (Derrida 389). Having some sense of this, Bloom, unlike Molly, is
unable to fully dismiss Rudy’s significance, and goes on mourning for him while Molly
has seemingly moved on from his death. The point at which Rudy is given a name is the
point from which Bloom cannot retreat—he is destined from there to see Rudy as
something worth mourning for. Acknowledging their child’s life, and necessarily his
death, he is given the name Rudy to represent that which will eventually perish—the
body and mind, with only the name left over to represent his place with God.
Inspired by Benjamin, Derrida suggests that the sadness attributed to
speechlessness, and specifically with Rudy, may not lie only with muteness, but also
with the issue of being named. Without the knowledge of being named, one cannot
affirm the name, or represent the name with any personality. Derrida comments on this
added problem of naming, suggesting that, “It is true that, according to Benjamin, the
sadness, mourning, and melancholy of nature and of animality are born out of this
muteness, but also out of and by means of the wound without a name: that of having
been given a name. Finding oneself deprived of language, one loses the power to
name, to name oneself, indeed to respond to one's name” (Derrida 388). Despite the
fact that people do not typically name themselves, there is a sense of identity lost and
sadness gained when one cannot respond to the assigned name. In part, this is the
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reason why Molly, in her soliloquy, cannot recognize or mourn Rudy as a fully realized,
living being, as Bloom does. On mourning for Rudy, Molly thinks:
I was in mourning thats 11 years ago now yes hed be 11
though what was the good in going into mourning for what
was neither one thing nor the other the first cry was enough
for me I heard the deathwatch too ticking in the wall of
course he insisted hed go into mourning for the cat. (Joyce
637)
In Molly’s estimation, Rudy was never enough of a person to mourn for, essentially
equalizing him with their cat. Bloom, on the other hand, who is willing to interpret the
cat’s behavior, believe his interpretations, and construct an identity for the cat, is willing
to mourn for Rudy, and does so throughout the novel.
Ultimately, however, there is more to their difference of opinion than a willingness
or unwillingness to interpret. Molly and Bloom approach language in differing ways,
causing their perception and outlook on Rudy to differ. Sheldon Brivic highlights this
difference in his essay, “The Veil of Signs: Perception as Language in Ulysses,” in
which he writes:
Bloom’s visual field of desire is a perpetual drive towards
physical images, especially voluptuous views of women.
While Stephen wants to pass beyond the veil of natural
appearances, Bloom is powerfully attracted to this very
veil…He does want the veil to move or indicate the life
principle behind it, or even, in a parody of the ideal, to fit
snugly. When it hangs loose or shows no signs (of life), it
becomes pure and repressive, an obstacle to contact with
the physical world, the living veil. (Brivic 743)
In contrast, Molly’s mind is not as tied to the physical world as Bloom’s is, and she
gravitates more towards ideas and language. This is evidenced by her soliloquy, in
which she covers a multitude of ideas, rapidly and soundly, while Bloom’s thoughts are
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often read as slower paced and as dictated by his physical surroundings. With Rudy as
the unclear signifier, the veil with no clear answers behind it, Molly and Bloom approach
the signified in two opposite ways. Understanding that Rudy was too young to have a
personality, too young to acknowledge his own existence, too young to show true
affection, and most importantly too young to truly suffer, Molly sees Rudy signified as
lacking meaning. She understands that grieving for Rudy would be difficult, since there
was never a personality to grieve for. Bloom, on the other hand, still understanding
Rudy as his son and uncomfortable without clear meaning behind the veil, finds the
memory of Rudy “repressive” as Brivic suggests. Battling against this repression, Bloom
sees Stephen as a surrogate for the ideas that should have been signified by Rudy,
even as Stephen shows no signs of desiring this relationship. Tragically, because of his
failure to connect with Stephen, the meaning behind Rudy’s veil remains empty and
unclear, dooming Bloom to continue mourning.
One gets the sense however, that Bloom is not entirely in disagreement with
Molly, as he struggles with accepting the same speechlessness that causes her to
dismiss Rudy. In the “Hades” chapter, as Bloom rides to Paddy Dignam’s funeral with
several others, he notices another funeral procession going by with a “tiny coffin” (Joyce
79). At this scene, Bloom thinks, “A dwarf’s face, mauve and wrinkled like little Rudy’s
was…Our. Little. Beggar. Baby. Meant nothing. Mistake of nature” (Joyce 79). In
referring to Rudy as a “mistake of nature,” Bloom displays his doubt about Rudy’s status
as a human being. With nature in this context being the sort of nature referred to by
Benjamin, including the natural world, the animal world, and the world of God, Rudy is a
mistake. By failing to gift Rudy with the ability to acknowledge his name, or in
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Benjamin’s words, being able to acknowledge the “communion of man with God’s
creative word,” God has made a tragic error. Later in the novel, as Bloom notices a bat
flying overhead, he thinks the following, “What is that flying about? Swallow? Bat
probably…There he goes. Funny little beggar” (Joyce 309). The repetition of funny little
beggar in this context furthers the hypothesis that Bloom is only half-convinced of
Rudy’s human significance. Despite being unintentional, Bloom reveals that he is
thinking about the bat and Rudy in the same mode, as something less than human. Of
course, Bloom struggles with these feelings alone, failing himself to communicate with
Molly. At the center of their marriage, pulling it apart, appears to be a disagreement over
whether to attempt to mourn “what was neither one thing nor the other,” or to accept
that one cannot mourn a being like Rudy. Though Bloom and Molly speak, their
relationship is essentially speechless, given that both intentionally avoid the most
important issue coming between them. Tragically, Rudy remains in the middle of the
husband and wife, with unseeing eyes and speechless lips, smiling in ignorance of the
tension he has created.
In Proteus, a section almost entirely composed of Stephen’s unceasing thoughts,
Stephen begins by considering the “ineluctable modality of the visible” (Joyce 31).
Describing the inescapable condition of human sight, Stephen goes on to lament what
might be perceived outside of this modality. In his essay “The Modality of the Audible in
Joyce’s Ulysses,” Joseph E. Duncan reflects on the equally ineluctable mode of the
audible, which is prominent in the diverse soundscape of Ulysses. Speaking to the
diversity and ubiquity of sound in Ulysses, Duncan writes:
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Ulysses is itself a kind of microcosm in which the varied and
unpredictable sounds of both the outer and inner world are
reproduced…Joyce frequently used onomatopoetic or
imitative devices to suggest a wide variety of sounds both in
the city itself and in the world of memory and imagination.
Through these imitations Joyce presented the unceasing flux
of sound as directly and immediately as possible. The range
and potentialities of the audible are indicated by imitations
ranging from the ‘krandlkrankran’ of the trams and the ‘tap,
tap’ of the blind stripling to the ‘heigho’ of the church bells
and Boylan’s ‘jingle’… (Duncan 291)
In layering sounds, which are quite often banal and meaningless, throughout
conversation and thought, Bloom faces yet another reminder that Rudy is entirely silent.
The consequence of this silence is an erasure of Rudy from the world, both past and
present, of remembrance and respect. Few, aside from Bloom, are thinking of Rudy as
an individual, and none think about Rudy as much as his father does. When others do
think of Rudy, as in the example of Stephen’s reference to “a misbirth with a trailing
navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool,” it is indirect and in relation to Rudy’s circumstance
rather than his being (Joyce 32). Bloom, on the other hand, frequently considers what
his son might have become if he were allowed to live. When Boylan’s keys are jingling
throughout the “Sirens” chapter, Bloom’s “light sob of breath” is “sighed on silent
bluehued flowers” (Joyce 220). Aligning with the frequent allusions to Rudy’s face as
“mauve,” and of course to Rudy’s silence, Bloom is sighing specifically about Boylan
while also sighing generally about Rudy. Describing the role of such sounds as Boylan’s
jingling in Ulysses, Duncan writes, “It becomes both a cause and an effect in the
irregular sequences of psychological changes…Heard and remembered sounds result
from, merge with, and initiate other perceptions and memories as well as feelings and
ideas” (Duncan 293). Because sounds operate this way in Ulysses, frequently causing
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associations of memories, feelings and ideas, it seems that the Dublin soundscape is a
sort of hell for Bloom. Though it is not always explicitly written, the ineluctable chorus of
the day’s sounds carry with them the reminder of Rudy’s failure to acknowledge his
individual identity, and more gravely, to commune with “God’s creative word.”
In the novel’s fifteenth chapter, “Circe,” Bloom enters a dream world, in which the
rules of reality no longer dictate the events. In her essay “Changing into an Animal,”
Maud Ellman provides an apt description of the dreamlike chapter in its relationship to
the animal:
In the topsy turvy dreamscape of Circe, human beings
change places with animals and machines, each of which
‘speaks in its own way,’ as Bloom says of the printing press
in ‘Aeolus.’ Human superiority is exposed as a delusion,
based on the repression of the animal and the mechanical,
repressions that return with a vengeance in “Circe” to
overthrow the baseless fabric of humanity. (Ellmann 3)
In having everything “speak in its own way,” Joyce gradually dissolves the
meaningfulness of human speech. Ellman suggests that the pussens’ “Mrkgnao” can be
read as the “‘semiotic’ underside of Joyce’s novel,” further suggesting that the banal
sounds she refers to as “wavespeech” drown out the meaning of human language
(Ellman 5). With human language being comprised of sound, there is no immediate
difference between a spoken word and the sound of waves crashing against the
beach—especially in Circe (Ellman 5). The chapter, then, cultivates a space in which
status as a human, animal, machine, or idea matters less than the passions held in
them. In Homer’s Odyssey, Circe is a goddess who turns Odysseus’ men into swine.
Unable to save them on his own, Odysseus is aided by Hermes, who gives him a magic
herb called “moly.” The herb prevents him from being turned into a pig, and allows him
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to save his men. Without “moly,” both the figurative magic herb of Hermes and Bloom’s
literal wife, Bloom cannot resist the powers of “Circe” in the chapter. With Bloom
occupying the body of an animal, the chapter almost dispels the idea of a reasonable
human/animal distinction, which is what underlies the painful legacy of Rudy. As
Bentham suggested, Derrida reiterated, and Ellman points out, “For Bloom as for
Jeremy Bentham, it is animal’s capacity for suffering, rather than for reason, that entitles
them to moral justice. It is also their suffering that elicits Bloom’s identification with their
plight…” (Ellman 16). Though Bloom’s masochistic tendencies trigger some amount of
pleasure in these scenes, he is nonetheless suffering. Unfortunately, if Bloom thinks he
can remedy his thoughts about Rudy by acknowledging that Rudy suffered, he still has
no way of knowing this information. When Rudy appears at the end of the chapter, he
does not acknowledge his own suffering or the suffering of Bloom. In fact, Rudy’s
speechlessness is relentlessly juxtaposed to the menagerie of animals, objects, and
people who do speak in “Circe.”
As Bloom is “caught in the act” of “cruelty to animals” by the watchmen, a group
of gulls from earlier in the novel come to vouch for his character. In the scene with the
gulls, Bloom passes a woman selling banbury cakes, but as he passes, he remarks,
“Wait. Those poor birds” (Joyce 125). Seeing that the gulls are hungry, Bloom throws
them the cakes, and thinks, “I’m not going to throw anymore. Penny quite enough. Lots
of thanks I get. Not even a caw” (Joyce 126). Of course, the gulls cannot show
appreciation for an act when they do not possess the concept of a kind act. Joyce later
gifts them with the ability to acknowledge Bloom’s kindness in front of the suspicious
watchmen, as they follow Bloom’s claim, “I am doing good to others,” with “Kaw kave
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kankury kake” (Joyce 370). Paddy Dignam, the half-corpse, half-beagle mentioned
earlier, also vouches for Bloom’s character. Joyce appears to be honoring animals here
with the redemptive quality of speech, of understood experience, and of acknowledged
kindness. Though the gift of speech given to animals and inanimate objects comes in
chapters full of other imagined impossibilities, there is a significance to allowing them
speech. The true issue, put so well by Rando and repeated once again here, is that “in
a book in which even a cap and a fan can speak and in which a dog can write and recite
poetry, Rudy Bloom is singularly speechless” (Rando 538).
In being “singularly speechless,” Joyce sets Rudy apart from all other characters
in the novel, animal and man. At the end of “Circe,” the screenplay-like chapter in which
some gulls, a cap, a button, a moth, and a fan all receive lines, this is what Rudy
receives:
(Gazes, unseeing, into Bloom’s eyes and goes on reading,
kissing, smiling. He has a delicate mauve face. On his suit
he has diamond and ruby buttons. In his free left hand he
holds a slim ivory cane with a violet bowknot. A white
lambkin peeps out of his waistcoat pocket.) (Joyce 497)
Rudy has no lines of speech, and communicates nothing concrete in his descriptions. In
fact, in an utterly tragic moment, the stage directions describe Rudy’s gaze as
“unseeing,” as he continues with his “kissing” and “smiling” (Joyce 497). Though Rudy’s
actions might suggest a happy scene, his unseeing stare and mauve face suggest a
separation and an otherworldliness—the same kind of unseeing, otherworldliness that
humans find gazing into the eyes of animals. In his book “Reading Joyce’s Ulysses,”
Daniel Schwarz comments on Rudy’s tragic silence in this scene: “Rudy’s ‘unseeing
eyes’ emphasize an inevitable gulf between Bloom’s reality as a character in Joyce’s
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Dublin and Rudy’s existence as a fiction of Bloom’s imagination” (Schwarz 227).
Though Bloom can emerge from “Circe” in full human form, Rudy cannot. Rudy’s
interior, unknown and impenetrable like the interior of all animals, remains an obstacle
to Bloom’s never-ending grieving process. Even without the grief aspect, the silence
and impenetrability itself connotes a certain sadness, taking us back to Benjamin’s
suggestion that, “Because she is mute, nature mourns” (Rando 536). To the slight
melancholy felt by many animal owners, Rando quotes Alice Kuzniar’s Melancholia’s
Dog, in which she comments, "melancholia means that, however close we are to the
canine pet, that closeness can never be enough and we are always conscious of the
obliqueness and imperfection that govern our communion with it and, hence, of a
fundamental muteness" (Rando 537). Due to his dying so young, only several days after
his birth, Rudy becomes confined to this “fundamental muteness.” As a cause, Bloom
will never know who his son was, why he got sick, or if he felt pain. Rudy, as a dead
infant, resists the fall of Adam, which Derrida describes as the moment man transitions
from animal to man. In a mute perpetuity, Rudy will never make the transition, which
explains why he is denied lines in “Circe” and never given the opportunity to tell his
father he loves him. Bloom appears determined to restore his love for Rudy in a
relationship with Stephen—after all, as Schwarz notes, Rudy’s appearance with the
lambkin points to the “traditional connection of child and lamb,” which is used by “one of
Stephen’s favorite poets,” William Blake (Schwarz 228). If Stephen has somehow “taken
Rudy’s place in Bloom’s imagination,” then he has also taken on the role of Rudy in their
conversations—speechless and inactive (Schwarz 228).
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Nonetheless, however speechless Stephen is in his relationship with Bloom, he
is at least capable of expression. There is still a hope, on Bloom’s part, that Stephen will
express himself, become mature, and find his way in the world as a man. Thinking of
what Rudy could have been, Bloom considers, “If Rudy had lived. See him grow up.
Hear his voice in the house” (Joyce 73). Bloom never had the privilege of truly
considering this outcome for Rudy, and instead is forced into the occasional dream of
“what if.” Having no understanding of Rudy’s personality or individuality, Bloom’s
interactions with Rudy were likely closer to those with the pussens than to those with
Stephen. This is because of the closedness and openness referred to by Agamben, in
that Rudy is as closed to the human world of truth as Bloom’s cat is, while Stephen’s
guarded center is still essentially open. Instead of a cat though, Rudy is representative
of the baby lamb, or the lambkin. During Bloom’s Circe hallucination, Rudy’s lack of selfawareness and lack of speech, combined with the symbolism of the white lambkin
peeping out of his pocket, produce an image not unlike an aimless, innocent, grazing
lamb. Since some infants will inevitably die very early while most survive to become
adults, Rudy’s death signifies a holy sacrifice. He is the lamb, given over to God, so that
Stephen and others may live long lives. If there is a remedy to Bloom’s despair and
Molly’s indifference, it may be in considering Rudy as the sacrificial lambkin. To die as
an infant, without having had a chance to assert himself in the world, it is difficult to think
of Rudy’s life as anything other than meaningless. However, when thinking of Rudy’s life
and meaning as sacrificial, he gains purpose, which would hopefully allow both Bloom
and Molly to restructure their response to his death.

35

Though possibly unaware of it, Bloom has Rudy in mind when he ponders animal
cruelty. On his way to Paddy Dignam’s funeral with several others, their carriage has to
stop for a group of cattle and sheep. Of the scene, Joyce writes, “A divided drove of
branded cattle passed the windows, lowing, slouching by on padded hoofs, whisking
their tails slowly on their clotted bony croups. Outside them and through them ran
raddled sheep bleating their fear” (Joyce 80). In a scene in which Bloom is mostly silent,
Bloom remarks aloud, “I can’t make out why the corporation doesn’t run a tramline from
the parkgate to the quays. All those animals could be taken in trucks down to the boats”
(Joyce 80). Taken as a bit of pragmatic advice, the group agrees with Bloom. However,
it is clear that Bloom’s sympathy for the animals surpasses his desire for a clear
thoroughfare. This is evidenced in other places throughout the novel when he considers
the plight of the animal, such as when he remarks, “Dead animal even sadder” (Joyce
93). Witnessing the innocent, frightened sheep, Bloom imagines his son as one of them,
enabling him to feel sympathy for an animal he just ate earlier that morning. The terrified
sheep headed towards slaughter and the mutton kidneys from breakfast intersect with
Rudy in their innocent, unquestioning sacrifice. In Lestrygonians, Bloom again wonders
about animal cruelty in the slaughterhouse business. Surmising the moral ugliness of
the slaughterhouse, Bloom thinks:
Pain to the animal too. Pluck and draw fowl. Wretched
brutes there at the cattlemarket waiting for the poleaxe to
split their skulls open. Moo. Poor trembling calves. Meh.
Staggering bob. Bubble and squeak. Butchers’ buckets
wobbly lights. Give us that brisket off the hook. Plup.
Rawhead and bloody bones. Flayed glasseyed sheep hung
from their haunches sheepsnouts bloodypapered sniveling
nosejam on sawdust…Ah, I’m hungry (Joyce 140).
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By imagining the innocent sheep, fowl, and cattle being slaughtered, Bloom is
unintentionally considering Rudy’s death and the question of Rudy’s suffering. The
phrase “glasseyed sheep” is reminiscent of the description of Rudy’s unseeing gaze in
Circe. The bottomless stare of the cat referenced by Derrida is the state of both the nonhuman animal and of Rudy. Though the “I’m hungry” at the end might seem to run
counter to his previous thoughts, it is the symbol of the sacrificial lamb, the thought of
Rudy’s sacrifice, that allows him to end with such an opposing idea. While the animals
might suffer, they will suffer for human benefit, just as Rudy assumes the place of the
dead infant so that other infants might be healthy.
In considering Rudy’s status as a human or animal, it is obvious that Rudy is a
human being. Neither Molly nor Bloom seriously believe that Rudy is biologically
anything less than human, but their differing, and sometimes aligning, perceptions of his
ontological experience force both to consider Rudy’s existential significance. If Rudy
lacks the fundamental attributes of the common human, whether it be the capability of
speech, Hume’s sentiment of humanity, or some other requirement, while featuring
fundamental attributes of nature, like closedness and speechlessness, then his true
biological status is irrelevant. The secret in understanding Rudy’s status is his unseeing
gaze, similar to the “bottomless gaze” referred to by Derrida. Describing this peculiar
phenomenon of the animal, Derrida writes, “As with every bottomless gaze, as with the
eyes of the other, the gaze called animal offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the
human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say the border crossing
from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself…” (Derrida 381). As the
sole speechless character in a novel where “everything speaks in its own way,” where
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Rudy remains locked in an unseeing gaze, Rudy is neither human, nor animal, nor
object, but a being on the limits of definition—a straddler of the border crossing. Being
none of the above, Rudy takes on symbol of the lambkin as his primary identity. Of
course, this is comforting for Bloom and Molly only insofar as it is accepted.
The very confusion over how to remember Rudy, or rather, what to remember
him as, causes the widening rift between husband and wife. Molly, comfortable with
forgetting about Rudy and avoiding the pain of remembering, has an easier time than
Bloom does with understanding how to mourn, or in Molly’s case, not mourn. Bloom, not
content with simply accepting Rudy’s suspended definition of being, struggles silently
throughout the novel, becoming more and more like his silent son. The sadness and
grief associated with Bloom’s struggle threatens to render him speechless as well,
evident in the many interactions and non-interactions Bloom has throughout Ulysses.
Nonetheless, it is possible that in becoming speechless, Bloom has actually brought
himself closer to the state of his son, and therefore closer to understanding Rudy. If
Heidegger’s human truth begins in the world of closedness and evolves into the
openness of the human world, then Bloom devolves throughout the episodes, becoming
closer to Rudy. By the end of Ulysses, readers may consider Bloom and Rudy more
connected than ever—weeping willows, one big and one small, connected in their sad
silence.
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